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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Ignazio Antonino Mannino ("Tony") and Emanuele 
Salvatore Mannino ("Sal") appeal the denial of petitions they 
filed under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 in which they sought to 
vacate, set aside or correct sentences imposed on them 
following convictions for charges arising from their 
involvement in a heroin distribution conspiracy. We hold 
that the defendants' sentencings did not conform to 
Amendment 78 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
or our holding in United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985 (3d 
Cir. 1992), and we will therefore vacate their sentences and 
remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
The heroin importation scheme the defendants were 
involved in is described in detail in United States v. 
Gambino, 728 F.Supp. 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1989), United States 
v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 956 (1991), and in the district court's Memorandum 
Opinion denying the defendants' S 2255 petitions in the 
instant case. Accordingly, we need only describe the 
defendants' involvement to the extent that it is helpful to 
our discussion of the issue before us. 
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In January 1989, a federal grand jury indicted eighteen 
individuals, including Tony and Sal Mannino, in connection 
with a heroin distribution organization that was based in 
New York City. Tony and Sal were subsequently tried and 
convicted of conspiracy to import and distribute heroin in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 963 and 846. Sal Mannino was 
also convicted of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1956(a)(1). On December 6, 1989, Tony was sentenced to 
a period of incarceration of 324 months (27 years), and Sal 
was sentenced to 216 months (18 years) incarceration the 
following day.1 Tony's base offense level under the 
Sentencing Guidelines was calculated as 36 in the Pre- 
Sentence Investigation Report ("PSI") because his offense 
involved at least 30 kilograms of heroin.2  See PSI of Tony 
Mannino at P 62. However, that was increased by four 
levels because the court found that he was also a"leader" 
under the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(a). Accordingly, 
Tony's total offense level was 40. Since he had no prior 
criminal record, his criminal history category was I; yielding 
a sentencing range of 292-365 months. Sal's base offense 
level in his PSI was also 36, and this was also based upon 
evidence that the Gambino conspiracy had distributed 
between 10 to 30 kilograms of heroin during the life of the 
conspiracy. Sal also had a criminal history category of I, 
but he did not receive an upward adjustment. Accordingly, 
the Sentencing Guideline table yielded a sentencing range 
of 188-235 months imprisonment for Sal. 
 
At sentencing, counsel for both defendants argued that 
the sentencing court could not determine the quantity of 
drugs each defendant was responsible for under the 
guidelines merely by relying upon the quantity of drugs 
attributed to the Gambino conspiracy. At Tony's 
sentencing, the court responded as follows: 
 
       I think because we have a conspiracy charge, kind of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The court also imposed a term of five years supervised release, a 
$25,000 fine, and special assessments in the amount of $100 for Tony 
and $150 for Sal. 
 
2. Section 2D1.1(c) provides for a base offense level of 36 when the 
quantity of heroin for which a defendant is found accountable falls 
between 10 and 30 kilograms. 
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       an ongoing offense, I think even as a legal matter, even 
       a subsequent involvement in a conspiratorial activity 
       can make a person liable under the law. 
 
* * * 
 
       On page 19 [of the PSI], where it . . . states that you 
       report that there was no evidence connecting [Tony 
       Mannino] with Simone Zito importations. We will not 
       change it; but I think your view of it is that, while 
       that's all right from the view point of the law of 
       conspiracy, it is not all right when we determine 
       involvement and participation. . . . 
 
       [Defense counsel]: Exactly, Your Honor. 
 
       [The court]: . . . I think we should preserve your 
       position, but the court won't change [the PSI]. 
 
App. 100a, 107. A similar exchange occurred at Sal 
Mannino's sentencing: 
 
       [The court]: This conspiracy went on for four years 
       . . . . [T]he evil of a conspiracy is that it does go on. 
       And that's why a person who joins late must, when 
       they join late, they are liable for what went on before, 
       if they do it knowingly and willfully. . . . 
 
       I don't think the guidelines, Mr. Fitzpatrick . . . . I don't 
       think you will change the law of conspiracy so long as 
       there are such insidious impacts upon the community 
       . . . That's why those who join on the last day are liable 
       for the first day and throughout. That's the problem 
       here. And he is not charged with handling a kilo of 
       this, just the conspiracy. I'm not arguing with you, I'm 
       just giving a response to what I think are your good- 
       faith beliefs about your expectation to change the law 
       of conspiracy. 
 
App. 137-38a, (emphasis added). Both Tony and Salfiled a 
direct appeal after the court rejected these arguments and 
imposed sentence. However, even though both defense 
counsel had preserved the issue of the quantity of heroin 
that could be attributed to their respective clients under the 
guidelines at sentencing, neither counsel raised the issue 
on direct appeal where we affirmed both of the convictions 
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and sentences. See United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 
1355 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
The defendants subsequently filed petitions pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 2255, arguing inter alia that the sentencing 
court violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights by 
misapplying the "relevant conduct" provisions of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines as amended, and that 
appellate counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise the 
issue on direct appeal. The petitions were referred to a 
Magistrate Judge who issued a Report and 
Recommendation in which she concluded that the 
challenged sentencings failed to conform to the 
requirements of Amendment 78 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, and that defendants' prior counsel had been 
ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. The 
Magistrate Judge recommended that the court conduct new 
sentencing hearings and make individualized findings 
regarding each defendant's respective role in the conspiracy 
in order to properly decide how much heroin to attribute to 
each of them. However, the court rejected the Report and 
Recommendation and denied the defendants' S 2255 
petitions. 
 
The court held that the claims were defaulted because 
neither defendant had raised that issue on direct appeal, 
and neither could demonstrate the cause and prejudice for 
that default that was the condition precedent to a decision 
on the merits of their S 2255 petitions. See United States v. 
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982). The Court also concluded 
that the defendants could not establish the prejudice 
necessary to a decision on their petitions because the PSIs 
and the sentencing transcripts supported the sentencing 
court's finding that they were each responsible for at least 
10 kilograms of heroin, if not for the entire 30 kilograms set 
forth in the counts of conviction. Accordingly, the court 
ruled that the petitions of both defendants lacked merit, 
and both petitions were dismissed. The Manninos thenfiled 
this joint appeal, and a panel of this court granted a 
certificate of appealability to review their claim that the 
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sentencing court erred in failing to excuse their procedural 
default under S 2255, and in applying U.S.S.G.S 1B1.3.3 
 
II. 
 
As noted above, the defendants did not challenge the 
sentencing court's attribution of the heroin on direct 
appeal. In United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 977 (3d Cir. 
1993), we held that the failure to raise a Sentencing 
Guidelines issue on direct appeal results in a waiver of that 
issue. Such a procedural default will not be set aside under 
S 2255 unless the petitioner can establish cause for the 
default and that prejudice resulted from it. Id . at 979. 
Accordingly, we must first address the government's 
contention that the defendants' failure to raise this issue on 
direct appeal precludes our review of the merits of the 
petitions. 
 
The Manninos argue that appellate counsel was 
ineffective in failing to appeal the trial court's application of 
the Sentencing Guidelines, and that such ineffectiveness 
satisfies the "cause" prong of Frady. It is, of course, well 
established that a successful showing of ineffective 
assistance of counsel may satisfy the "cause" prong of a 
procedural default inquiry. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991); Lines v. Larkin, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 
WL 291412, at *12 (3d Cir. 2000); and United States v. 
Sanders, 165 F.3d 248, 250 (3d Cir. 1999). However, it can 
only do so if the ineffectiveness rises to the level of a 
constitutional deprivation under Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. To 
establish such a deprivation the defendants mustfirst 
demonstrate that "counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 688.4 If that is established, defendants must then show 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.SS 1291 and 2253(a), and 
we exercise plenary review. United States v. Lloyd, 188 F.3d 184, 186 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
4. Although the Strickland test was initially formulated in the context of 
trial counsel's stewardship, it applies with equal force to our analysis 
of 
the defendants' challenge to the performance of appellate counsel. See 
Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 444-45 (3d Cir. 1987); see also McKee v. 
United States, 167 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Cook, 
45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Merida, 985 F.2d 
198, 202 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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that they were prejudiced by counsel's deficient 
performance. Id. at 687. This requires that they 
 
demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id.  at 694. 
 
Thus, we can not reach the merits of the defendants' 
claim here unless they can first establish that they were 
denied effective assistance of appellate counsel under 
Strickland. However, given the nature of theirS 2255 claim, 
it is not possible to resolve the Strickland claim without 
first determining if their challenge to the court's application 
of the Sentencing Guidelines is meritorious. If it is not 
meritorious, the defendants can not successfully argue that 
counsel's failure to raise the claim on direct appeal denied 
them their constitutional right of representation. 
Accordingly, we will first discuss their Strickland claim. 
That claim rests upon Amendment 78 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and our decision in United States v. Collado, 
975 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1992). Amendment 78, which became 
effective on November 1, 1989 (one month prior to the 
Manninos' sentencing), amended Application Note 1 to 
S 1B1.3 and provides in relevant part: 
 
       In the case of criminal activity undertaken in concert 
       with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy, 
       the conduct for which the defendant "would be 
       otherwise accountable" also includes conduct of others 
       in furtherance of the execution of the jointly- 
       undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably 
       foreseeable by the defendant....Where it is established 
       that the conduct was neither within the scope of the 
       defendant's agreement, nor was reasonably foreseeable 
       in connection with the criminal activity the defendant 
       agreed to jointly undertake, such conduct is not 
       included in establishing the defendant's offense level 
       under this guideline. 
 
In Collado, we set forth the proper analysis for sentencing 
courts to use when deciding whether to increase a 
defendant's sentence based upon conduct of an accomplice 
or co-conspirator. We stated: 
 
       The language of this note indicates that, rather than 
       evaluating accomplice attribution in light of the scope 
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       of the conspiracy as described in the count of 
       conviction and the defendant's awareness of the 
       possibility that co-conspirators would distribute 
       amounts in addition to those amounts distributed by 
       the defendant, courts should look to the defendant's 
       role in the conspiracy. Specifically, the note instructs 
       courts to assess accomplice attribution by determining 
       whether the co-conspirator's conduct was `in 
       furtherance of the ... jointly-undertaken ... activity' (as 
       opposed to the conspiracy as described in the count of 
       conviction), `within the scope of the defendant's 
       agreement,' and `reasonably foreseeable in connection 
       with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to 
       undertake.' U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, application note 1 
       (emphasis added). In our view, this language indicates 
       that whether a particular defendant may be held 
       accountable for amounts of drugs involved in 
       transactions conducted by a co-conspirator depends 
       upon the degree of the defendant's involvement in the 
       conspiracy and, of course, reasonable foreseeability 
       with respect to the conduct of others within the 
       conspiracy. 
 
Collado, 975 F.2d at 991-92. 
 
Here, the sentencing court was clearly influenced by the 
size and duration of the criminal conspiracy the defendants 
were part of and the quantity of drugs charged to the 
conspiracy. As noted above, during Sal's sentencing 
hearing, the court stated: "This conspiracy went on for four 
years. . . . [T]he evil of a conspiracy is that it does go on. 
And that's why a person who joins late must know, when 
they join late, they are liable for what went on before, if 
they do it knowingly and willfully." App. 137a. However, in 
Collado, we cautioned: 
 
       in deciding whether accomplice attribution is 
       appropriate, it is not enough to merely determine that 
       the defendant's criminal activity was substantial. 
       Rather, a searching and individualized inquiry into the 
       circumstances surrounding each defendant's 
       involvement in the conspiracy is critical to ensure that 
       the defendant's sentence accurately reflects his or her 
       role. 
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975 F.2d at 995. We also stated, absent "unusual 
circumstances, . . . conduct that occurred before the 
defendant entered into an agreement cannot be said to be 
in furtherance of or within the scope of that agreement." Id. 
at 997. 
 
Counsel for Tony Mannino clearly made this argument to 
the sentencing court though he did not specifically refer to 
Amendment 78. See N.T. 12/6/89 at 6-7. The court 
responded by noting counsel's objection in order to preserve 
it for appeal, and then proceeding to make an explicit 
finding that Tony Mannino played a leadership role in this 
conspiracy. However, the court did not conduct a 
"searching and individualized inquiry" as to whether Tony 
could have reasonably foreseen that this jointly-undertaken 
activity would distribute in excess of 10 kilograms of 
heroin. Rather, the court relied upon the total amount of 
heroin attributed to the conspiracy in the PSI to arrive at 
an offense level of 36. See PSI of Tony Mannino at P 62. As 
the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded, this approach 
falls short of that required by Amendment 78. Such an 
error is all the more significant where, as here, a defendant 
faces possible attribution of a significant amount of heroin 
that was concededly distributed before he joined the 
conspiracy. Id. at P 15; Addendum to PSI at p. 18; N.T. 
12/6/89 at 4. 
 
Similarly, the transcript of Sal's sentencing establishes 
that the sentencing court also failed to conduct a proper 
inquiry into the drugs that should be attributed to Sal. 
Sal's attorney specifically called the court's attention to the 
change occasioned by Amendment 78. See N.T. 12/7/89 at 
13-14. The court responded to what it viewed as counsel's 
"good-faith beliefs about [counsel's] expectation to change 
the law of conspiracy," N.T. 12/7/89 at 17, by reiterating 
the evils of conspiracies and relying upon the maxim that 
"those who join on the last day are liable for the first day 
and throughout." Id. However, in Collado we stated our 
disagreement with those courts that viewed accomplice 
attribution under the guidelines as being coextensive with 
accomplice liability under the law of conspiracy. We noted 
that the Circuit Courts of Appeals were not in agreement as 
to the scope of accomplice attribution under the guidelines, 
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but stated: "[w]e need not take a position regarding the 
proper interpretation of conspiracy law, for in our view, the 
relevant conduct provision [of the guidelines] is not 
coextensive with conspiracy law." 975 F.2d at 997 
(emphasis added). 
 
Here, the sentencing court found that Sal was involved in 
the communication aspect of the conspiracy, which it 
characterized as "the heart of the distribution conspiracy." 
However, there was no specific inquiry to determine 
whether, given Sal's individual role, he could reasonably 
foresee that the conspiracy would distribute the quantity of 
heroin attributed to him at sentencing and whether the 
quantity allocated to him was part of his undertaking. 
Instead, the court relied upon the law of conspiracy to 
conclude that Sal's sentence should reflect the quantity of 
drugs set forth in the count of conviction as stated in the 
PSI. Thus, the court arrived at the base offense level of 36 
and the corresponding sentencing range of 216 months. 
 
Similarly, paragraph 61 of Sal's PSI states, in relevant 
part: "Section 1B1.3 (relevant conduct) allows us to 
consider all the behavior in furtherance of this conspiracy. 
The government reported that the Gambino conspiracy 
distributed more than 10 kilograms of heroin throughout 
the life of the conspiracy. The base offense level is therefore 
36." That conclusion is inconsistent with Amendment 78 
and the pronouncements of Collado, and the court therefore 
erred when it relied upon that erroneous methodology to 
calculate the appropriate sentence for Tony and Sal  
Mannino.5 Although the attorneys for both defendants 
raised this point at sentencing, as noted above, neither 
pursued that issue on appeal, and the Manninos now 
contend that the omission denied them the effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution. We 
agree. 
 
This is not a situation in which counsel failed to 
anticipate a change in the law, see Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 
F.3d 666, 670-71 (3d Cir. 1996), quoting Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Both PSIs were apparently prepared before Amendment 78 was 
adopted by the Sentencing Commission. 
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1989)("there is no general duty on the part of defense 
counsel to anticipate changes in the law"), because both 
attorneys were aware of the issue and raised it at 
sentencing. Thereafter, in support of the petitions 
subsequently filed under S 2255, the defendants submitted 
sworn affidavits from both trial counsel in support of their 
assertion that counsel's failure to raise this claim on direct 
appeal was not a tactical or strategic decision. The 
government did not choose to cross-examine trial counsel 
in opposing the defendants' 2255 petitions. Rather, the 
prosecutor stipulated to their affidavits. Although neither 
trial attorney had a specific recollection of their reasons for 
not pursuing this argument on appeal, both swore that his 
decision was not a strategic or tactical one. Attorney 
Carnesi, counsel for Tony, could not remember discussing 
any sentencing issues with his colleague (Attorney Russo) 
when they were preparing Tony's direct appeal. In the brief 
he filed in this appeal, current counsel for the defendants 
states, "the court's docket shows that defense counsel did 
not even order and did not have a sentencing transcript 
during the time they were working on the appeal." 
Appellants' Br. at 31; App. 6a, 13a. Attorney Fitzpatrick 
could not "think of any reason why [he] would not have 
raised on appeal an issue of such potential importance that 
had been preserved at sentencing, except oversight or 
misjudgment." App. 179a. 
 
In denying relief and rejecting the Recommendation and 
Report of the Magistrate Judge, the court stated that both 
defendants were 
 
       represented by excellent attorneys who zealously 
       represented them at every level of the proceedings and 
       raised every feasible defense. The court cannot 
       conclude that the failure to raise the issue on direct 
       appeal was an oversight. Even if the court did find that 
       it was oversight rather than strategy, that failure does 
       not meet the "objectively unreasonable standard." 
 
Dist. Ct. Memorandum at 17. There is nothing in the record 
to support this conclusion. Morever, given the nature of the 
conspiracy charged in the instant indictment and the 
severity of the Sentencing Guidelines, we are unable to 
imagine any strategic or tactical justification for failing to 
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pursue an argument of such obvious merit and importance 
as the proper method for attributing drugs to a defendant 
being sentenced under U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3. The only plausible 
explanation is that counsel simply did not have sufficient 
space in their appellate briefs and dropped this claim even 
though it had significant merit. However, assuming 
arguendo that would justify abandoning this argument after 
it had been preserved at sentencing, current counsel 
represents (without contradiction) that such was clearly not 
the case. In the brief filed in this appeal, current counsel 
represents that the briefs filed in the direct appeals of both 
Tony and Sal were well under the page limitation and that 
appellate counsel could certainly have included a claim 
based upon the misapplication of U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3. See 
Appellants' Br. at 30-31. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the only possible explanation 
for such an omission is the very reason that the trial 
attorneys gave. They simply overlooked it, or they 
misjudged. Though the district court rejected this 
explanation because of the skill and experience of defense 
counsel, it is the only explanation consistent with this 
record. Clearly, no defense attorney is infallible no matter 
how experienced he or she may be; and zealous 
representation, even by an experienced attorney, does not 
displace the possibility of human error. Therefore, we 
conclude that the court's finding that the omission was 
deliberate is clearly erroneous. See United States v. 
Monostra, 125 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 1997). 6 
 
As the government correctly points out, the court was not 
compelled to credit the trial counsel's affidavits if there 
exist "sound reasons" for not doing so. See Appellee's Brief 
at 14 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 
573-74 (1985)). However, we can find no such "sound 
reasons" on the record here, and the government has not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The court also speculates that "Counsel could reasonably have 
decided that they could not prevail on the sentencing issue and that 
raising it in the appeal would be futile." Dist. Ct. Memorandum at 18. 
However, there is nothing in the record to support that speculation, and 
it is difficult to imagine how attorneys with the expertise and experience 
of trial counsel here could reach such a conclusion given the text of 
Amendment 78. 
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been able to suggest any. The court rejected counsel's 
affidavits in a footnote stating: "[g]iven counsel's familiarity 
with the case and the issues, the court does notfind these 
affidavits credible." Dist. Ct. Memorandum at 16 n.14. The 
court could have held an evidentiary hearing if it doubted 
the veracity of counsel's affidavits, see United States v. Day, 
969 F.2d 39, 41 (3d Cir. 1992), and/or the government 
could have called the affiants as witnesses in an effort to 
impeach their sworn statements. See Rule 8 of the Rules 
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.7 That was not done, 
and we are left only with their unchallenged (and facially 
logical and consistent) explanation of their omission. 
 
We " `must judge the reasonableness of counsel's 
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, 
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.' " Sistrunk v. 
Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1996)(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Given the affidavits submitted 
by counsel and stipulated to by the government, the fact 
that the sentencing issues were raised at sentencing and 
preserved for appeal and that no other sentencing issue 
was raised on appeal, there is simply no rational basis to 
believe that counsel's failure to argue the relevant conduct 
issue on appeal was a strategic choice. See Barnett v. 
Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 1999)(deficiency of 
appellate counsel can be established by showing that 
counsel failed to raise an issue that was obvious from the 
trial record); United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th 
Cir. 1995)(same in S 2255 context); United States v. 
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1991)(failure to 
raise obvious and potentially successful sentencing 
guidelines issue at sentencing cannot be said to have been 
a strategic choice but, rather, amounts to ineffective 
assistance). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.  We do not suggest that the district court had to accept the averments 
contained in the affidavits in the absence of the affiants appearing in 
court. However where, as here, there is nothing on the record to 
contradict the averments and where the averments contain no internal 
inconsistency, a court must have some basis for rejecting the sworn 
testimony of otherwise credible affiants, especially where those affiants 
are officers of the court. 
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However, as noted above, the defendants must do more 
than show that counsel's failure to pursue the issue of their 
sentencing on direct appeal was not reasonable. Strickland 
requires that the defendants demonstrate that they were 
prejudiced by counsel's failure to pursue this meritorious 
claim. 
 
III. 
 
The district court held that defendants must show more 
than that their sentences would have been vacated and the 
case remanded for resentencing in order for them to 
establish prejudice under Strickland and prevail on their 
S 2255 petitions. The court held that the defendants also 
had to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome 
of that resentencing would have been "favorably different." 
Dist. Ct. Memorandum at 18. The court then noted that the 
defendants were "important actors that agreed to 
participate and did knowingly participate, in a conspiracy 
that had as its object the importation from Italy and 
distribution within the United States, of a seemingly 
limitless supply of heroin." Id. at 19. The court stated: "[i]f 
the court were to resentence Petitioners, . . . the court 
would be guided by the same sentencing criteria in 
resentencing Petitioners to the very sentences imposed on 
December 6 and 7, 1989. Therefore, under the Strickland 
test, the prejudice prong cannot be met and Petitioners' 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails." Id. at 20-21. 
However, the court applied the wrong test. The test for 
prejudice under Strickland is not whether petitioners would 
likely prevail upon remand, but whether we would have 
likely reversed and ordered a remand had the issue been 
raised on direct appeal. See, e.g., Barnett, 174 F.3d at 1135 
(prejudice resulting from appellate counsel's omission of 
issue on appeal established where inclusion of issue 
"probably would have resulted in reversal"); McKee, 167 
F.3d at 108 (had counsel made proper challenge on direct 
appeal, petitioner would have been granted a new trial); 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 64-65 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
 
In Forte, we considered a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel based upon trial counsel's failure to raise an 
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objection to purportedly racially motivated peremptory jury 
strikes. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), was 
pending before the Supreme Court, but defense counsel 
failed to object despite a specific request from defendant 
and a consulting attorney that he do so. Forte was 
convicted and thereafter challenged his trial attorney's 
failure to raise the Batson claim. After noting that Forte 
would have been successful in having the matter remanded 
on direct appeal had the Batson issue been preserved at 
trial, we applied Strickland and concluded that the trial 
attorney's performance had been unreasonable and had 
prejudiced Forte by denying him a just result on appeal. 
Forte, 865 F.2d at 64-65. We did not require Forte to show 
that he would have prevailed on the Batson issue following 
remand. Thus, the prejudice prong of a Strickland analysis 
is satisfied if there is a reasonable probability that the 
result of the appeal would have been different had 
counsel's stewardship not fallen below the required 
standard. 
 
For the reasons set forth in our discussion regarding the 
sentencing proceedings of the Mannino brothers, we agree 
with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that there is a 
reasonable probability that, had counsel raised an 
Amendment 78 claim on direct appeal, we would have 
vacated the defendants' sentences and remanded for the 
kind of analysis required under Collado. The defendants 
can therefore establish ineffective assistance of counsel 
under Strickland, and they have therefore demonstrated the 
cause and prejudice that will excuse the procedural default 
that resulted from counsel's failure to challenge their 
sentencings on direct appeal. See, e.g. , Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)(counsel's errors that rise to 
constitutional ineffectiveness under the Strickland standard 
constitute cause for procedural default); Essig , 10 F.3d at 
979.8 
 
Our analytical waters are muddied however, because the 
defendants must demonstrate prejudice under Strickland to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Given this determination, it is unnecessary for us to consider the 
additional claims raised by defendants as cause for their failure to 
pursue the Sentencing Guidelines issue on direct appeal. 
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establish cause for procedural default, and they must also 
establish prejudice as part of the "cause and prejudice" 
analysis under Frady. The latter requires defendants to 
show that the district court's attribution of drugs was to 
their "actual and substantial disadvantage." Frady, 456 
U.S. at 170. As noted above, the district court concluded 
that the defendants were not prejudiced because it would 
impose the very same sentences if defendants were 
resentenced. The court reasoned, "[p]etitioners agree[d] to 
participate in a far-reaching conspiracy that they knew had 
as its object the importation and distribution of heroin in 
quantities that easily exceeded 10 kilograms." 
Memorandum Opinion at 26. We have already determined 
that defendants' sentencing proceedings fell short of the 
requirements of Collado; thus, we need not revisit that 
issue here. Rather, we will proceed to determine whether 
defendants can establish that the court's conflation of the 
law of conspiracy and principles of accomplice attribution 
under the guidelines worked to their "actual and 
substantial disadvantage." Despite the court's 
pronouncement that the defendants would receive the same 
sentence on remand based upon their involvement, we 
conclude that the defendants have established the 
necessary prejudice under Frady. 
 
Absent waiver (which is not implicated here), a defendant 
has an unqualified right to be present at sentencing, see 
Rules 32(c), and 43(a) Fed. R. Crim. P., and this extends to 
resentencing upon remand. United States v. Moree , 928 
F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Taylor, 
11 F.3d 149 (11th Cir. 1994). We recently described Rule 
43's requirement that a defendant be present at the 
imposition of sentence as a "fundamental procedural 
guarantee that places the defendant before the judge at a 
culminating moment of the criminal judicial process." 
United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Additionally, it is now well established that a due process 
violation may result from the method by which the sentence 
was determined, and not just from the ultimate sentence 
imposed. See United States ex rel. Jackson v. Myers, 374 
F.2d 707, 711 n.11 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 
Obviously, a criminal defendant must be afforded due 
process at sentencing. See United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 
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475, 477 (3d Cir. 1985)(citing Townsend v. Burke , 334 U.S. 
736 (1948)). Moreover, it is beyond dispute that a 
sentencing calculation may violate the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment if there is a possibility that the 
sentence imposed may have been based on legal and/or 
factual error. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 865 F.2d 551, 
560 (3d Cir. 1989)(en banc)(resentencing required where 
there is "unacceptable risk" that two of defendant's 
sentences are the result of misconception concerning their 
legal effect); United States v. Katzin, 824 F.2d 234, 240 (3d 
Cir. 1987)(citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 
(1972)("sentencing on the basis of materially untrue 
assumptions violates due process"); Moore v. United States, 
571 F.2d 179, 183-84 and n.7 (3d Cir. 1978)(due process 
may require resentencing when information on which 
sentencing court relied in PSI is mistaken or unreliable). 
Here, the district court's sentence was based upon the 
Probation Department's blanket conclusion that "Section 
1B1.3 (relevant conduct) allows [it] to consider all the 
behavior in furtherance of this conspiracy." However, 
Collado requires a finding that the co-conspirators' conduct 
was in furtherance of the jointly-undertaken activity, within 
the scope of each defendant's agreements, and reasonably 
foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity each of 
the Manninos agreed to undertake. Collado, 975 F.2d at 
991-92. Denying the defendants' request for resentencing 
without such an inquiry based only upon the district 
court's declaration that it would impose the very same 
sentence upon remand would be tantamount to allowing 
the defendants to be sentenced in absentia. 
 
Despite the district court's belief that defendants would 
each receive the same sentence as a result of their 
individual conduct, defense counsel must have an 
opportunity to force the government to meet its burden of 
proof as to any drugs attributed to either defendant based 
upon someone else's conduct. Collado, supra. See also 
United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1545 (3d Cir. 
1993). Although the government asserts that the record 
clearly demonstrates that each defendant was responsible 
for at least 10 kilograms of heroin, and probably far more, 
see Appellee's Br. at 22-4, counsel for the defendants 
purports to "give[ ] the benefit of every reasonable doubt to 
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the court's analysis. . ." while rebutting a substantial 
quantity of the drugs attributed to the defendants in the 
PSI. See Appellants' Br. at 19-24. 
 
For example, the district court attributed to each 
defendant six kilograms of heroin that were removed from 
couriers at Italian and United States airports in March of 
1986. However, this heroin was personally placed on the 
couriers by a person named "Allegra." The district court 
allowed an amendment to the PSI, to reflect that there was 
no evidence that the Manninos were participating in the 
heroin importation operation in March 1986. PSIs atPP 14 
and 15. Similarly, although not specifically included in the 
court's calculation of 10-plus kilograms, there was no 
finding as to how much of the eighty kilograms of heroin 
attributed to "Ricupa" was imported and distributed after 
defendants joined the conspiracy in 1986. Moreover, the 
indictment referred to heroin that was exchanged for the 
hundreds of kilograms of cocaine from Columbia. The PSIs 
attribute this to Tony and Sal merely by concluding that 
this exchange "elucidated the scope and breadth of the 
conspiracy." Dist. Ct. Memorandum and Opinion at 26-27. 
The testimony of witness Cuffaro regarding this 570 
kilogram cocaine transaction was challenged at Tony 
Mannino's sentencing and the district court directed the 
probation officer to correct paragraph 25 of the PSI to read 
that "a government witness testified that he was told that 
Mr. Mannino and Simone Zito had assisted [one the bosses 
involved in the transaction]." Id. at 27 n.22 (emphasis 
added). 
 
"Information used as a basis for sentencing under the 
Guidelines must have `sufficient indicia of reliability to 
support its probable accuracy.' " United States v. Miele, 989 
F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993)(quoting U.S.S.G. S 6A1.3(a)). 
The district court must, therefore, afford Tony and Sal 
Mannino a meaningful opportunity to challenge whether 
the quantity of heroin ultimately attributed to each was 
reasonably foreseeable by each so that neither defendant 
will be sentenced for drugs that should not be attributed to 
him under the guidelines. The underlying S 2255 
proceeding did not afford defendants this opportunity. 
Accordingly, the district court's assertion that it will impose 
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the same sentence upon remand does not negate afinding 
of prejudice under Frady, and it, therefore, does not negate 
the necessity of a remand. 
 
We do not suggest, however, that the district court is 
necessarily precluded from reimposing the same sentence 
on each of these defendants following remand if the court 
conducts the required searching and individualized inquiry 
as to both defendants and concludes that the sentences 
that were originally imposed were appropriate under 
Amendment 78 as amplified by Collado. However, absent 
such an inquiry, the sentences previously imposed can not 
stand. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the court's 
opinion denying defendants' S 2255 petitions and remand 
this matter for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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